Type of bind: Hardcover
Dewey Decimal Number: 940.5426693
EAN num: 9780760317396
ISBN number: 0760317399
Label: Zenith Press
Manufacturer: Zenith Press
Quantity: 1
Page Count: 258
Printing Date: 2003-09
Publishing house: Zenith Press
Sale Popularity Level: 741670
Studio: Zenith Press
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When these two [authors] combine their considerable experience, the reader has to pay attention. Naval Aviation NewsIn 1999, by a vote of 52 to 47, the U.S. Senate cleared the names of Admiral Husband Kimmel and Lieutenant General Walter Short of blame for leaving Pearl Harbor vulnerable to attack. According to the declaration, Kimmel and Short had performed their duties 'competently and professionally,' and that America's losses at Pearl were 'not the result of dereliction of duty.' Revisionist historians have been trying for years to portray Short and Kimmel as innocent scapegoats. However, Major General Kenneth Bergquist is among the many witnesses who went to their graves crying 'foul,' but not before telling their stories to historians Jack Lambert and Norman Polmar.This book combines the evidence of never-before-seen photos and documents, Lambert's taped interviews with some of the last surviving witnesses, exhaustive research of all remaining evidence, Polmar's perspective as naval warfare commentator for the History Channel, and Barry Levenson's legal experience trying cases before the U.S. Supreme Court, to finally put the case of the tragic failure of command and dereliction of duty leading up to December 7, 1941, to rest.Senator Strom Thurmond called Kimmel and Short 'the final two victims of Pearl Harbor.' In reality, was the last victim the truth?
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Rated by buyers 
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This is a short, crisp book that can be read in a single sitting outlining the failures in the Hawaiian command structure of the Army and Navy immediately before and during the attack on Pearl Harbor. It does not address the issues of failures in intelligence, communications, and command in Washington. For those see Clausen, "Pearl Harbor Final Judgement" and Victor, "The Pearl Harbor Myth." I do not recommend Prange, "Pearl Harbor, The Final Judgment" due to its many errors in fact and analysis.
Over time the Pearl Harbor debate has divided authors into two general camps; those seeking to blame Roosevelt and the service commanders in Washington while absolving Kimmel and Short, and those attempting to present the situation with blame passed around to everyone. The charges against Roosevelt usually center around the idea that he pushed Japan to attack the US, knew when it would occur, and failed to notify Hawaii so the effect of the attack would galvanize the American people into entering the war (against both Japan and Germany.) The corollary to this is that Kimmel and Short were sacrificed as scapegoats to keep scrutiny away from the truly guilty parties. Books such as Kimmel's "Admiral Kimmel's Story" and Theobald's "The Final Secret of Pearl Harbor" take this point of view. Leyton's postumous book "And I Was There" adds to the literature but contains inaccuracies designed to deflect blame from his intelligence and cooperation failures.
This book simply focuses on Kimmel's and Short's command failures and treats all other exogenous failures as of little consequence. There is much merit to this approach in that it shows what the Hawaiian command did and did not do to prepare for war and to defend itself without getting bogged down in other issues. A military commander is charged to do the best possible job with the resources he has, including intelligence, and this book, in a very cut and dried manner, rates Kimmel and Short (Short primarily) on this single responsibility. The conclusion is that both commanders were woefully derelict in their duties.
There was little (or none) cooperation between the Army and Navy commands even though Kimmel and Short enjoyed a very friendly relationship. The right hand did not know what the left hand was doing, and critical functions fell through the crack as both thought the other was taking responsibility for those functions. Yes, the lack of an overall commander was a deficiency that can be attributed to inter-service rivalry and a command failure in Washington, but the two commanders on the ground could have done much more to alleviate the problems. Unfortunately they didn't. Turf wars also raised their ugly heads among subordinates as discussed in this book, and were not addressed by the commanders.
This book shows that the Hawaiian command was given a healthy number of very first line aircraft for defense and reconnaissance, but failed to put them into service and use them effectively. In addition, the radar system and the Aircraft Warning Service (AWS) were operable but Short failed to integrate then into an effective defense system. In both cases, blame must rest with the Hawaiian commanders and their subordinates, most of whom enjoyed subsequent promotion and rewarding careers.
The Navy spotted and sunk a hostile submarine an hour before the attack, but the communications procedures were so poor that no action of any kind was taken by Kimmel's staff on this incident before the Japanese air attack. Nor was the radar warning heeded by the Army staff, apparently in part because fighter aircraft and their pilots were not on alert and in most part the aircraft were parked without combat ammunition loads. There was no system in place to identify the incoming planes due to a lack of Army-Navy liasion, and no system of communication to operational commanders or their staffs. Truly, the Hawaiian commanders were taking their responsibilities at a glacial, peacetime pace and not attending to details and the resources they possessed.
An item of note is that the authors accurately mentioned that Short lowered the alert level from 2 to 1 prior to the attack, but failed to state that Short communicated this to General Marshall in accordance with his instructions. Unfortunately, this only lulled Marshall into believing the Short had placed his command on the highest possible alert status. The problem, unstated in this book, was that Short had reversed the alert status numbers from 1-highest to 3-lowest to 1-lowest to 3-highest without notifying Marshall. This was another communications failure that must be attributed to Short.
The authors dismiss the charges against Roosevelt and Marshall saying they "... would never have risked the loss of the Pacific Fleet and Pearl Harbor's naval facilities for the mere pretext of America's entry ... Read More
Rated by buyers 
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This book is an excellent examination of a system failure that prevented the U.S. military from mounting an effective defense against the Japanese attack at Pearl Harbor on 7 December 1941. It is concerned exclusively with failure of the U.S. Air Defense System which had been carefully designed to defend against such an attack.
The air defense system designed for Hawaii was an integrated and modern (at the time). It incorporated such newfangled sub-systems as air warning radars (five sites) and a centralized control center serving as filter and ground control intercept (GCI) center staffed by both army and navy personal with direct communications to the radar sites, army air pursuit (fighter) squadrons, army anti-aircraft regiments, and the U.S. Navy warships anchored in Pearl Harbor (fire direction for their ship borne anti-aircraft guns.
In addition there was an air reconnaissance sub-system that would utilize both army and navy long range patrol planes to reconnoiter probable Japanese attack routes. All in all a very effective system that would have probably done a good job of defending Oahu.
In the months prior to December 1941 all the hardware for the system was in place and the control center was up and running. Unfortunately, like intelligence systems, this air defense system was only as good as the command structures it served. Neither the commander of the U.S. Pacific Fleet, Admiral Kimmel nor the commander of the Army's Hawaiian Department demonstrated any interest in the establishment or operating procedures of the system. Since they did not understand it they made little effort in the months before Pearl Harbor to ensure that their senior subordinates cooperated with and supported the system. Not only did the navy opt out of an active role supporting the system, but so did the army. Neither service was wiling to supply either the long range reconnaissance patrols essential to the system nor the personnel needed to adequately man the control center. In the absence of any senior direction intra- and inter- service rivalries and parochial interests hamstrung the air defense system.
As is often the case with system failures of any type there is plenty of blame to go around. The authors of this book are especially hard on Admiral Kimmel, General Short and their senior commanders and staffs. It is certainly true that the senior army and navy commands displayed a remarkable lack of interest in or curiosity about what was after all the very first line of defense for Hawaii. It is also true both commands appeared to lack strategic sense in their blindness to the possibility that the Japanese might attack the American fleet at anchor in Pearl Harbor. On the other hand, the normally brilliant Chief of Staff, General Marshall, does not appear to have made any effort to correct their strategic misperceptions. Further, the brilliant young officers who were really responsible for creating the air defense system appear to have made no effort to explain and `sell' the system to the senior commands.
Rated by buyers -
There are countless books about Pearl Harbor, and even a few good ones. Whether this counts as one of the good ones really depends on what you are looking for.
If you are looking for tales of dauntless daring, look elsewhere. If you are looking for dark conspiracies, look elsewhere. Above all, if you are looking to absolve General Short and Admiral Kimmel of responsibility for having failed to defend their commands, certainly look elsewhere.
"Defenseless" really has only one strength, but it's a very important one. The key to effective defense of Pearl Harbor would have been a modern air defense system (modern by 1940-41 standards, that is). Lambert and Polmar show clearly that Short was given the materials and personnel to build a good system, and adequate time, but failed to get it in operation by 7 December, basically because he didn't place much emphasis on it. In this he was abetted by Kimmel, who didn't hold up his relatively minor responsiblities for the system.
The book also lays out lesser but still crucial failings regarding reconnaissance, fighter readiness, and AAA readiness. By the letter of existing regulations both officers should have been court-marshalled for all this, rather than being given the slap on the wrist that they got. (Of course MacArthur in the Philippines should have been given a good old fashioned American tarring and feathering rather than a Medal of Honor, but that's another story.)
Whether Kimmel and Short were given adequate and specific warning really has nothing to do with it. They failed to properly prepare their commands for defense and put them in a defense posture appropriate to what they fully knew the general situation to be. This book does a good job of showing that.
Rated by buyers 
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The ending sentence on the dust jacket has " ... in one final probe into the command failures leading up to 7 Decmeber 1941." As a "final probe" into aspects of Pearl Harbor, this text published in 2003, is far from being even adequate. The partial oath "The Truth, the Whole Truth, and Nothing but the Truth" is ill-served by the authors.
For example, on page 12 there is an emphatic paragraph which reveals the book's obvious slant - "Roosevelt and Army Chief of Staff General George C. Marshall would never have risked ... It would have taken a conspiracy not of two men, but of thousands over several decades to pull off such a far-fetched scheme in perfect secrecy."
Emphatic - no; wishful maybe. Why? Are the authors ignorant or did they obligingly just neglect some facts, for example: (a) the Stimson diary entry about manuevering the Japanese into firing the very first shot without causing too much damage to ourselves, and (b) just how many people knew for over sixty years that the Lusitania was carrying contraband - FDR for one is certain? Or how many tens of thousands of people kept the ENGIMA/ULTRA secret for many decades?
Another of their complaints is a "lack of preparedness" - here the authors miss or conveniently forget saliant operational facts. For example, on long-range aerial reconnaissance, that a transition in type (between PBY-3 and PBY-5 variants) was underway, that there were "break-in" problems with the PBY-5 engines, that spares for PBY-5s were almost non-existent, that fully trained aircrews were small in number. And, the authors, while noting that many more PBY-5s were asked for ... do not mention the fact that well over 200 of these birds were sent to England in 1941 under the Lend-Lease program by order of Harry Hopkins. That the spares and trained crews went along is well-known; the PBY-5's pilot which spotted the Bismarck was an America. [A far more worthy treatment of this topic is found Gannon's "Pearl Harbor Betrayed" (e.g., see page 323, note 56).]
For better "preparedness" - perhaps if the Hawaiian commanders were made aware of the "Kita Messages" (aka "Bomb Plot") read in Washington in the Fall of 1941, or of the true status of negotiations with the Japanese in Washington, or if Kimmel/Short had acess to a PURPLE machine (by October 1941, England had four and Hawaii none), or if the Knox "midnight" (midnight of 6 December 1941) message sent from Washington to Kimmel was received, or ...
And, where is that Knox message today? Talk about conspiracies!
Rated by buyers 
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This book attempts to provide some insight into the subject of Admiral Husband Kimmel and General Walter Short and their roles in the attack on Pearl Harbor. Although the information presented in the book is good, it is very basic and does not go into much detail. The information included in the book really only amounts to a thumbnail sketch, and the author seems to concentrate his discusion more on the shortcomings of General Short than Admiral Kimmel.
The author bases his arguments from information obtained from the several Pearl Harbor inquiries, mainly the Army and Navy board inquiries. For example, in the chapter entitled "Accountability", each charge against Short is listed, along with an analysis of the response of Short. What perplexed me is why a similar approach was not taken in regards to Admiral Kimmel? I felt that by reading this book, much of Admiral Kimmel's story was omitted.
There are some interesting parts of the book, however. The author presents compelling evidence about the inter-service rivalries that existed between the Army and Navy, and how these rivalries directly lead to the disaster on December 7. Also, the failure to coordinate training and liasion activities between the two branches is effectively discussed.
Overall, I found this book to be interesting, but very basic. The information presented is good, but only the surface is scratched and the author doesn't go into great detail on any subject. I would recommend this as an introductory book, but there are other books about Pearl Harbor that discuss these same topics in much greater detail than this one does.
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